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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2014, the Seventh Circuit upheld a circuit split 
regarding the mandatory minimum safety valve provision, which 
provides low-level defendants who meet five criteria the chance to 
receive a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
1
 Specifically, the 
split concerns the safety valve’s truthful disclosure requirement, which 
requires defendants provide all the information they have to 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW Executive Notes and Comments Editor, 
2014–2015; M.S.J., 2006, Northwestern University, Medill School of Journalism; 
B.M., 2002, University of Denver, Lamont School of Music. 
1
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1996).  
1
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prosecutors
2
 ‒ also called “the heart of the provision.”3  The circuits 
disagree as to whether a defendant when they invoke the provision but 
then lie or omit information to prosecutors before telling the truth is 
eligible for the safety valve.
4
 The Seventh Circuit holds that when a 
defendant invokes the safety valve and lies to prosecutors, even if he 
eventually tells the truth, he cannot receive safety valve relief.
5
 The 
other circuits hold that defendants may lie at a proffer before 
providing complete disclosure and still retain safety valve eligibility.
6
 
These circuits permit eligibility within a range: some provide safety 
valve relief when a defendant provides prosecutors with a single lie;
7
 
at least one has gone so far as to state a defendant will not 
automatically lose eligibility even after committing perjury at trial.
8
 
The Second Circuit best summarizes the reasoning of the circuits that 
allow safety valve relief despite previous lies: the [safety valve’s] text 
provides no basis for distinguishing among defendants who make full 
disclosure immediately upon contact with the government, defendants 
who disclose piecemeal as the proceedings unfold, and defendants 
who wait for the statutory deadline.”9 
In Part I, I discuss the mandatory minimums and safety valve. 
In Part II, I analyze the Circuit split about the safety valve provision. 
                                                 
2
 There is a second circuit split regarding whether the information must be both 
objectively and subjectively truthful, but that is outside the scope of this article. See 
United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 166, 170-71 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Sherpa, 110 F.3d 656, 659-63 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 
143, 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000); Sentencing, Telling the Truth and the Safety Valve: 
Three Circuits Differ 17 No. 10 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 4 (May 14, 2003). 
3
 United States v. Feliz, 453 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 2006). 
4
 United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 
65 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108-09 
(2d Cir. 1999).  
5
 Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d at 971.  
6
 United States v. Padilla-Colon, 578 F.3d 23, 31-2 (1st Cir. 2009); Mejia-
Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1108; Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103; Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738 at 
745; United States v. Rodriguez, 676 F.3d 183, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
7
 United States v. DeLaTorre, 599 3d 1198, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010). 
8
 United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). 
9
 Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 106. 
2
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In Part III, I critique mandatory minimums and the way judicial 
interpretation, particularly by the Seventh Circuit, superimposes 
substantial assistance – the requirement that defendants have useful 
information that assists prosecutors - on the safety valve. In Part IV, I 
argue courts should not superimpose substantial assistance on the 
safety valve and instead utilize the plain language reading.  
 
MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE SAFETY VALVE 
 
Sentencing in the federal system is a complex interaction 
between mandatory minimums and the sentencing guidelines.
10
 For 
some crimes, including drug crimes, judges are statutorily required to 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence.
11
 For drug crimes, mandatory 
minimum sentences are based on the type and amount of drug a 
defendant possessed.
12
 Before the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Reform Act, adopted in 1994, defendants could only receive a lesser 
sentence if they substantially assisted prosecutors.
13
 Applying a “grim 
calculus [in which] drug kingpins may suffer little while subordinates 
serve long sentences,”14 high-level criminal defendants could 
                                                 
10
 Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects of the “Safety Valve” Amendment on 
Length of Imprisonment for Cocaine Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders: 
Mitigating the Effects of Mandatory Minimum Penalties and Offender’s Ethnicity, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 401, 404 (2001-2002). 
11
 United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007); Philip 
Oliss, Note, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851 (Summer 1995).  
12
 United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2010); Alison Siegler & Erica K. Zunkel, Written Statement of the Federal 
Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School Submitted to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on “Reevaluating the Effectiveness of 
Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences”, 1, U. OF CHIG. L. SCH. (Sept. 18, 2013) 
available at  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/clinicblog/Federal%20Criminal%20Justice%20Cl
inic%20Written%20Statement%20for%20September%2018%202013%20Hearing%
20on%20Federal%20Mandatory%20Minimums.pdf.  
13
 United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1996); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(e) (West Supp. 1988).  
14
 United States v. Milo, 506 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2007). 
3
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substantially assist prosecutors to receive a lesser sentence because 
they had more knowledge of the criminal extent of their activities, 
whereas low-level criminal defendants were ineligible for shorter or 
less sever sentences because they had no such information and could 
not substantially assist prosecutors with their investigations.  
The result further goes against the purpose stated in the 
sentencing section of the United States Code, “[t]he court shall impose 
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”15 The Code 
states “[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be 
imposed, shall consider . . . the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” as well as 
“the need for the sentence imposed ‒. . . to provide just punishment,” 
“afford adequate deterrence,” and “protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant.”16 Thus judges, scholars, the American Bar 
Association, the Judicial Conference, and the Sentencing Commission  
called for change because mandatory minimums “undermine federal 
sentencing reform goals of uniformity and proportionality.”17 Indeed 
“disparity is inevitable” under mandatory minimums.18 A report 
summarizes Congress’s concerns: “for the very offenders who most 
warrant proportionally lower sentences ‒ offenders that by guideline 
                                                 
15
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (West). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Albonetti, supra note 10, at 427; U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 
(1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (West); Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, United 
States v. Dondon Fletcher, 2009 WL 2730304 (D.Conn.) (citing United States 
Sentencing Commission, Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, Executive 
Summary, pp. v-viii (May 2002)); Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec., (2009) (Testimony 
of the Hon. J. Julie E. Carnes, Chair of the Criminal Law Committee on behalf of the 
Judicial Conference) 8, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Carnes090714.pdf; Hearing on 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Sec., (2009) (Statement of Julie Stewart, President, Families against 
Mandatory Minimums) 6, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Stewart090714.pdf. 
18
 Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the 
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 112 (1993). 
4
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definitions are the least culpable ‒ mandatory minimums generally 
operate to block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.”19  
These concerns about deleterious and harsh sentences led 
Congress to pass a provision, which gives low-level, nonviolent drug 
offenders the chance to receive a sentence below the mandatory 
minimum.
20
 This exemption, referred to as the safety valve, applies to 
federal drug offenses including possession, conspiracy and 
importation.
21
 To be eligible for the safety valve, defendants must 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they meet five 
enumerated criteria:  
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal 
history point . . .;  
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible 
threats of violence or possess a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon . . .;  
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily 
injury;  
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense . . . and 
was not engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise . . .; and  
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all 
information and evidence the defendant has concerning 
the offense or offenses that were part of the same 
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but 
                                                 
19
 Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform Act of 1994, H.R. REP. NO. 103-
460, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1994 WL 107571 (1994). 
20
 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1983); Hearing on Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra note 18, at 24; U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, (1991); Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences: The Safety Valve and Substantial Assistance Exceptions, 1, 5, available at 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=746019. 
21
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2006); Jeffrey J. Shebesta, The “Safety Valve” Provision: Should the Government 
Get an Automatic Shut-Off Valve?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 529, 536 (2002). 
5
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the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful 
other information to provide or that the Government is 
already aware of the information shall not preclude a 
determination by the court that the defendant has 
complied with this requirement.
22
  
Although meeting all five criteria may be difficult, the safety valve can 
“provide[] an important escape from mandatory minimum 
sentencing.”23 If a defendant meets the requirements, he is eligible for 
a reduced sentence, so a judge waives the mandatory minimum and 
imposes a “strictly regulated reduction[]” under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.
24
 While theoretically the safety valve provides 
an escape hatch for lower level offenders, from its enactment there has 
been much debate over whether it in fact “protect[s] low-level drug 
offenders from inflated sentences.”25 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines assign offenses “an initial 
base sentencing level” based on the amount of drugs the defendant 
possessed.
26
 The offense constitutes a certain number of points, and 
the judge adds points for aggravating factors and subtracts points for 
mitigating factors.
27
 Finally, the judge adjusts the sentence within the 
                                                 
22
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (West 1995).  
23
 Francesca Bowman, Make the Safety Valve Retroactive, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 
120, 120 (1999-2000). 
24
 United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1996). 
25
 Natasha Bronn,”Unlucky Enough to Be Innocent”: Burden-Shifting and the 
Fate of the Modern Drug Mule Under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) Statutory Safety 
Valve, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 483 (2012-2013). 
26
 Brian T. Yeh, Federal Cocaine Sentencing Disparity: Sentencing Guidelines, 
Jurisprudence, and Legislation, available at 
http://congressionalresearch.com/RL33318/document.php?study=Sentencing+Levels
+for+Crack+and+Powder+Cocaine+Kimbrough+v.+United+Sates+and+the+Impact
+of+United+States+v.+Booker. 
27
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A-D (2002); Molly N. Van Etten, 
The Difference Between Truth and Truthfulness: Objective Versus Subjective 
Standards in Applying Rule 5C1.2, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1265, 1271 (May 2003); Yeh, 
supra note 27. 
6
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mandatory range based on the offender’s criminal history.28 The 
Sentencing Guidelines discount potentially mitigating – and generally 
relevant − issues such as the offender’s “family and community ties, 
education, and employment,”29 and only permit judges to consider 
factors such as the defendant’s cooperation for possible sentence 
reduction.
30
 In contrast, the safety valve permits judges to consider 
further mitigating factors, and can have a major impact on sentences.
31
 
Under the safety valve, the government provides input as to whether 
the defendant met his burden, but judges may independently decide 
whether the defendant shared all the information he had available.
32
 If 
the judge determines the defendant met all five requirements – even if 
the information they provided was not useful ‒ the judge must impose 
the safety valve.
33
 
 Frequently, there is no dispute about the first four 
requirements: 1) criminal history; 2) use of violence; 3) “death or 
serious bodily injury;” and 4) offender level.34 However the fifth 
element requires a defendant “[n]ot later than the time of the 
sentencing hearing . . . truthfully provide to the Government all 
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses.”35 This element is subject to several interpretations, and is 
                                                 
28
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2002); Special Report to 
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
supra note 21, at 19.  
29
 Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1498 (2000). 
30
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A-D (2002); Van Etten, supra 
note 28, at 1272.  
31
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 5 (1994); Bowman, supra note 24, at 120; 
Albonetti, supra note 10, at 407. 
32
 United States v. Oye, 397 F. App’x 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Valenzuela-Sanchez, 245 F. App’x 678, 680 (9th Cir. 2007); Oliss, supra note 11, at 
1885. 
33
 United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Alvarado-Rivera, 412 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir. 2005). 
34
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). 
35
 Id.; United States v. Steward, 93 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1996). 
7
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thus the most heavily litigated.
36
 Courts interpret the fifth element as 
requiring a defendant to provide information about other crimes that 
are “part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or 
plan,” which includes “uncharged related conduct.”37 Courts 
sometimes refer to this as the “‘tell all you can tell’ requirement.”38 
The truthfulness requirement, particularly regarding prior inconsistent 
statements, is the subject of an ongoing circuit split.
39
  
 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE SAFETY VALVE 
 
In the Seventh Circuit, defendants are not eligible for the safety 
valve if they lie to prosecutors after invoking the safety valve ‒ even if 
they come clean before their sentencing date.
40
 Several other circuits 
hold defendants may meet the complete and truthful disclosure 
requirement even if they lie to prosecutors so long as they ultimately 
tell the truth, although courts may properly consider any prior lies or 
inconsistent statements when determining whether the eventual 
disclosure was complete and truthful.
41
 The best way for a defendant 
to receive safety valve relief is to provide a proffer to the government, 
either through a debriefing or in writing, and be prepared to prove his 
                                                 
36
 United States v. Brownlee, 204 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1086 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Shrestha, 86 
F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ceballos, 605 F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087, 1096 (10th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 459 (6th Cir. 2001); United States. v. Cruz, 
156 F.3d 366, 372 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 753 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
37
 United States v. Miller, 151 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1998); Ceballos, 605 
F.3d at 472; Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d at 1096; United States v. Montes, 381 
F.3d 631, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2004); Salgado, 250 F.3d at 459; Cruz, 156 F.3d at 372. 
38
 Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 939 (quoting United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 
375, 378-79 (10th Cir. 1995).  
39
 United States v. Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1998); Brownlee, 204 F.3d 
at 1302. 
40
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2014).  
41
 United States v. Padilla-Colon, 578 F.3d 23, 31-2 (1st Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2003). 
8
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statement is complete and truthful.
42
 These safety valve debriefings 
occur under a variety of circumstances, “from an intense grilling to a 
perfunctory conversation undertaken primarily to satisfy the formal 
requirements of the safety valve.”43 The Circuits also disagree as to 
when the complete truthful disclosure must occur. Many courts require 
defendants provide disclosure before their sentencing hearing; others 
do not require complete disclosure until the actual sentencing, or even 
the second sentencing hearing.
44
 This distinction plays no role in the 
Seventh Circuit because defendants lose any hope of safety valve 
relief if they are not completely forthcoming at their first debriefing.
45
 
Yet in other circuits, the distinction can make a large difference.  
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s View: Prior Inconsistent Statements Bar a 
Defendant from Safety Valve Eligibility 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to interpret truthful disclosure 
as requiring a defendant make a “good faith effort to cooperate” with 
authorities from the moment he invokes the safety valve.
46
 Some 
policy reasons behind this good faith interpretation include efficiency 
and the benefits of an easy-to-apply bright-line rule, as one omission 
or lie automatically forecloses safety valve relief.
47
 Another argument 
underlying the good faith interpretation is that the government should 
not have to conduct multiple investigations, nor repeatedly share its 
                                                 
42
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1996). 
43
 Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly 
a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1073 (2001); 
e.g. Flanagan, 80 F.3d at 146; United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
44
 Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305; United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th 
Cir. 1996); Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1105; United States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 
738, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 
1995); Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103 at 108-09. 
45
 United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998). 
46
 United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1996). 
47
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2014); Davis v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 
(2006). 
9
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information with a defendant simply to get the complete truth.
48
 
Further, the government has the right to expect defendants tell the 
truth and not try to game the system.
49
 Consistently, the Seventh 
Circuit holds “lying is inconsistent with a good-faith effort to 
cooperate, and thus a sentencing judge may refuse the safety valve to a 
defendant who was caught lying during safety[]valve debriefings.”50 
Thus, it stands to reason a judge may refuse safety valve relief for a 
defendant who later tells the complete truth because the safety valve 
was intended to protect only those defendants who fully disclose all 
information they possess during their first debriefing.
51
 The Seventh 
Circuit expressed concern about giving a defendant multiple 
opportunities “to change his version of events and attempt to make a 
more complete disclosure until the version comports with the 
government’s evidence.”52 For similar reasons, the court further held 
that a letter purporting to be a complete truthful statement that denies 
culpability where the evidence proves otherwise does not make a 
defendant eligible for the safety valve.
53
 It reasoned “[c]ontinu[ing] to 
cling to a false version of events and dispute [one’s] culpability . . . is 
a sufficient basis for refusing to invoke the safety valve.”54 In an early 
case, United States v. Marin, the Seventh Circuit emphasized a 
“defendant is not entitled to deliberately mislead the government and 
wait until the middle of the sentencing hearing to . . . provide a truthful 
disclosure.”55  
                                                 
48
 Marin, 144 F.3d at 1093-94. 
49
 Marin, at 1093-94; Shebesta, supra note 22, at 548. 
50
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2014); Montes, 
381 F.3d at 637; Ramunno, 133 F.3d at 482. 
51
 Marin, 144 F.3d at 1086, 1092; United States v. Nunez, 627 F.3d 274, 282-
833 (7th Cir. 2010). 
52
 Marin, 144 F.3d at 1091. 
53
 United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 814 (7th Cir. 2009). 
54
 Id. 
55
 Marin, 144 F.3d at 1091. 
10
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1. The Seventh Circuit Reaffirmed its Safety Valve Approach 
in United States v. Acevedo-Fitz 
 In January 2014, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its approach to 
the safety valve.
56
 In United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, it explicitly 
rejected the “plain language” interpretation used by other circuits.57 
The opinion Judge Flaum authored stated:  
None of these decisions persuades us to retreat from 
our common-sense understanding that a defendant who 
intentionally lies while seeking to benefit from the 
safety valve is not acting in good faith and is not within 
the class of offenders whom Congress intended to 
protect from potentially harsh statutory minimum 
penalties. The point of § 3553(f)(5) is that a defendant 
who waits until the last minute to seek the safety valve 
will not be penalized for his tardiness, but tardiness is 
very different from trying repeatedly to deceive the 
government until time has run out.
58
  
In Acevedo-Fitz, the Seventh Circuit precluded safety valve eligibility 
for a defendant who initially lied before providing the truth.
59
 
Prosecutors charged Acevedo-Fitz with conspiracy, heroin 
distribution, and three counts of using a communication facility in 
committing a felony drug crime.
60
 Acevedo-Fitz pleaded guilty to the 
conspiracy charges, and admitted to selling heroin on several 
occasions.
61
 The government dropped the other charges.
62
Acevedo-
Fitz lied during two safety valve briefings, both before and after his 
guilty plea; he only admitted the truth after the government confronted 
his lies using recorded conversations.
63
 Acevedo-Fitz continued to 
deny remembering the events, but told investigators he might 
                                                 
56
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2014). 
57
 Id. at 971. 
58
 Id.  
59
 Id. at 969. 
60
 Id.  
61
 Id. at 968. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. at 969. 
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remember more if he could hear the recordings.
64
 The government 
argued Acevedo-Fitz was ineligible for the safety valve because he 
failed to provide “all [the] information” he had.65 Acevedo-Fitz 
contended the safety valve applied because before his sentencing 
hearing he sent the government a letter where he admitted to all heroin 
sales, identified his customers and supplier, and described the location 
of each transaction.
66
 The government countered Acevedo-Fitz lied, 
did not cooperate during his safety valve debriefings, denied 
documented offenses, and his letter contained insufficient detail.
67
 
Acevedo-Fitz argued he provided some truthful statements during the 
debriefings and the missing details were unimportant.
68
 Nonetheless, 
the district court found his “debriefings ‘absolutely would not come 
anywhere close to being in the ball park of qualifying’ him for the 
safety valve, particularly since he denied events which were 
demonstrably true.”69 The district court reasoned, while the letter 
technically met statutory requirements because Acevedo-Fitz tendered 
it prior to sentencing, it was “too little too late, with emphasis on the 
too little,” noting that the defendant only provided the “bare 
minimum” of information.70 Acevedo-Fitz’s sentencing range, had he 
been eligible for the safety valve, would have been between 87 and 
108 months: the court sentenced him to 120.
71
  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence and reasoned 
“Acevedo-Fitz apparently contends, he was free to lie to the 
government so long as, if found out, he retracted his lies and made a 
full, truthful disclosure before the sentencing hearing.”72 The Seventh 
Circuit held that because Acevedo-Fitz’s debriefing statements were 
“demonstrably false in light of the recorded telephone conversations,” 
and contradicted his guilty plea as well as statements he made during 
                                                 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 970. 
70
 Id. at 969. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 970. 
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his plea colloquy, he intentionally deceived investigators and thus 
“forfeited his eligibility for the safety valve by lying, i.e., trying to 
secure a sentencing benefit through bad faith.”73 The opinion 
highlighted that even in circuits that do not consider prior lies bad 
faith, courts may consider those lies in determining if the defendant 
eventually told the truth.
74
 The Seventh Circuit further reasoned “[t]he 
point of [the safety valve] is that a defendant who waits until the last 
minute to seek the safety valve will not be penalized for his tardiness, 
but tardiness is very different from trying repeatedly to deceive the 
government until time has run out.”75 The Seventh Circuit held that 
due to Acevedo-Fitz’s “lack of cooperation” and “resistance to 
admitting irrefutable offense conduct” he could not prove his letter 
was complete and truthful by “a bare assertion.”76  
 
B. Other Circuits Hold that a Defendant May be Eligible for the Safety 
Valve Even After Lying to Prosecutors 
The majority of circuits utilize a plain-language reading of the 
safety valve, granting relief even to defendants who initially lied to 
prosecutors, so long as they provided complete truthful disclosure.
77
 
However, the circuits disagree as to the timing of the truthful 
disclosure. Some circuits hold complete disclosure prior to the 
sentencing hearing − even in the judge’s chambers on the day of the 
sentencing hearing ‒ qualifies a defendant for the safety valve.78 Other 
courts grant relief to defendants who repeatedly withheld information, 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 971. 
74
 Id.at 970. 
75
 Id. at 971. 
76
 Id. at 972. 
77
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1999); United 
States v. DeLaTorre, 599 3d 1198, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brownlee, 
204 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 
(8th Cir. 1999). 
78
 DeLaTorre, 599 3d at 1206; United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 98-100 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305; United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 
1521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103 at 107; Deltoro–Aguilera v. 
United States, 625 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010). 
13
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or committed perjury at trial, so long as, before their sentencing 
hearing, the defendants provide complete disclosure.
79
 
1. In Many Circuits, While Prior Lies and Inconsistent Statements do 
Not Preclude Safety Valve Relief, Those Statements May be 
Considered as Evidence Regarding Truthful Disclosure 
 Several Circuits hold that, while lies or omissions do not 
automatically foreclose safety valve relief, a defendant’s lies are 
relevant to determining if the final statement is complete and 
truthful.
80
 Because lies are relevant, the court may “consider any lies 
the defendant may have told when evaluating the defendant’s 
truthfulness.”81 The Second Circuit pointed out that a defendant who 
lies or changes his story “risks irrevocably undermining his or her 
credibility” leading to doubts his disclosure is truthful and complete.82 
Defendants risk exposure of their lies at the sentencing hearing, which 
would preclude safety valve relief.
83
 It further reasoned that the 
government could refuse to meet with a defendant caught in a lie, 
because lying damages the defendant’s credibility.84 The First Circuit 
warns defendants that avoiding a debriefing is dangerous because the 
defendant must prove he provided truthful disclosure, and it is unlikely 
a defendant is unable to provide information unknown to the 
government.
85
 The First Circuit has implied that, following an 
inadequate attempt at truthful disclosure a defendant might meet the 
complete and truthful disclosure requirement by requesting an 
additional chance.
86
 Even in circuits where prior lies and inconsistent 
statements are considered, a defendant who told several different 
stories may remain eligible, as sentencing courts may “credit the last 
                                                 
79
 Jeffers, 329 F.3d at 98-100. 
80
 Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305; Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 107; Deltoro–Aguilera, 
625 F.3d at 437; United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 610 (4th Cir. 2012) cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 627 (2012). 
81
 Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305; Aidoo, 670 F.3d at 610. 
82
 Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103 at 107. 
83
 Id.  
84
 Id. at 108. 
85
 United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1996). 
86
 Id. at 524. 
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version of events as truthful and grant safety valve relief on such 
basis.”87  
 
2. In Some Circuits Even Repeated Lies Do Not Preclude Safety Valve 
Relief, so long as a Defendant Provides Complete Truthful Disclosure 
by His Sentencing 
 Some circuits hold even repeated lies do not preclude safety 
valve relief.
88
 In these circuits, “the safety valve is available so long as 
the government receives the information no later than the time of the 
sentencing hearing, even if a defendant’s last-minute move to 
cooperate is a complete about-face.”89 The Eighth Circuit holds early, 
consistent cooperation is “not a precondition for safety valve relief.”90 
In United States v. Deltoro–Aguilera, the Eighth Circuit upheld safety 
valve relief for a defendant who lied in three interviews, but provided 
complete disclosure at a fourth interview before she was sentenced.
91
 
Similarly, in United States v. Tournier, the Eighth Circuit specifically 
rejected the contention safety valve relief “must be denied to those 
whose tardy or grudging cooperation burdens the government with a 
need for additional investigation.”92 The Eighth Circuit further found 
accepting responsibility and substantially assisting the government are 
not “precondition[s] to safety valve relief, which is even available to 
defendants who put the government to the expense and burden of a 
trial.”93  
Similarly, in United States v. Mejia-Pimental, the Ninth Circuit 
overturned a safety valve denial because the district court “construed 
good faith too broadly.”94 Mejia-Pimental had three sentencing 
hearings; he eventually offered to share what he knew, but the 
government refused because he lied and his information would be 
                                                 
87
 United States v. Gomez-Perez, 452 F.3d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2006). 
88
 Deltoro–Aguilera v. United States, 625 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2007).   
89
 Deltoro–Aguilera, 625 F.3d at 437. 
90
 United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).   
91
 Deltoro–Aguilera, 625 F.3d at 437. 
92
 Tournier, 171 F.3d at 647. 
93
 Id.  
94
 United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2007). 
15
Kitchen: Don't Break the Safety Valve's Heart: How the Seventh Circuit Sup
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
343 
 
useless.
95
 Mejia-Pimental wrote a letter providing everything he knew, 
including the involvement of others.
96
 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
“good faith” requires nothing more than truthful complete disclosure 
by the sentencing, because “[a]nything else would unjustifiably 
impose on a defendant an additional burden above and beyond the 
plain meaning of the [safety valve’s] text.”97 The court further 
reasoned “the good faith inquiry focuses on the defendant’s 
cooperation in fully disclosing his knowledge of the charged offense 
conduct, not on identifying a defendant’s pre-sentencing delays in 
providing this information.”98 The court concluded a defendant 
satisfies the truthfulness requirement “regardless of his timing or 
motivations.”99 In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the 
idea that good faith requires a defendant provide the disclosure 
without delay or “attempts to impede law enforcement investigation” 
because the Sentencing Guidelines already require judges impose 
lengthier sentences for obstruction.
100
   
 
3. Some Circuits Hold that Even Defendants who Confess, then 
Recant, or Commit Perjury at Trial, then Provide Complete Truthful 
Disclosure may still be Eligible for Safety Valve Relief 
 In United States v. Schreiber, the Second Circuit held, 
assuming “complete and truthful” disclosure, the defendant complied 
with the safety valve by submitting a letter and affidavit prior to his 
sentencing.
101
 The court reasoned: 
[t]he plain words of the statute provide only one 
deadline for compliance . . . Nothing in the statute 
suggests that a defendant is automatically disqualified 
if he or she previously lied or withheld information. 
Indeed, the text provides no basis for distinguishing 
                                                 
95
 Id. at 1103. 
96
 Id.  
97
 Id. at 1104-05. 
98
 Id. at 1106. 
99
 Id.  
100
 Id. at 1107 (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1, 3E1.1, 5K1.1.). 
101
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999). 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
344 
 
among defendants who make full disclosure 
immediately upon contact with the government, 
defendants who disclose piecemeal as the proceedings 
unfold, and defendants who wait for the statutory 
deadline by disclosing “not later than” sentencing.102  
The Second Circuit held that withholding information − or indeed 
even committing perjury at trial − does not automatically make a 
defendant ineligible for the safety valve as long as, by the time of his 
sentencing, he truthfully provides all the information he has.
103
 Where 
a defendant meets all five safety valve requirements, the court cannot 
deny safety valve relief.
104
 In Schreiber, the Second Circuit expressly 
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Marin: that the 
government’s interest in the truth during interviews “provides any 
basis for placing additional requirements on defendants who seek to 
comply with the safety valve.”105 Instead, the Second Circuit held, 
“the government’s right to a [safety valve] disclosure does not accrue 
until [sentencing],” emphasizing the government can penalize 
“defendants who lie or withhold information during proffer sessions” 
under other statutes.
106
  
 Other courts provide safety valve relief even to defendants who 
confess then recant because the “recantation does not diminish the 
information” provided by the defendant.107 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
“[t]he safety valve statute is not concerned with sparing the 
government the trouble of preparing for and proceeding with trial,” or 
“providing the government a means to reward a defendant for 
supplying useful information.”108 Rather, “the safety valve was 
designed to allow the sentencing court to disregard the statutory 
minimum in sentencing first-time nonviolent drug offenders who 
                                                 
102
 Id. at 106. 
103
 United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 98-100 (2d Cir. 2003). 
104
 Id. at 100.  
105
 Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 108 (citing United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 
1093 (7th Cir. 1998). 
106
 Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice). 
107
 United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996). 
108
 Id. 
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played a minor role in the offense.”109 Following similar reasoning, the 
D.C. Circuit remanded a case for resentencing consistent with the 
safety valve.
110
 The defendant in United States v. Rodriguez originally 
lied about a cocaine transaction in part because he feared for his 
family.
111
 The D.C. Circuit held, because Rodriguez eventually “‘came 
clean about all aspects of the transaction,’ he met all five elements.”112  
The Tenth Circuit holds a defendant who provides complete 
truthful disclosure in the Judge’s chambers just before his sentencing 
hearing is not barred from safety valve relief merely because of his “‘ 
last ditch effort’ before sentencing.”113 The Eighth Circuit goes one 
step further, reasoning that, while typically full and complete 
disclosure should happen before sentencing “to prevent the defendant 
from misleading the government or manipulating the sentence,” 
complete disclosure sufficient to meet the fifth element for safety 
valve relief may be possible even after the sentencing hearing 
begins.
114
 In United States v. Madrigal, the Eighth Circuit clarified a 
statement it made in an earlier decision: “a defendant who cynically 
waits to see what the government can prove at sentencing before 
telling all is unlikely to warrant safety valve relief.”115 In Madrigal, it 
highlighted “‘unlikely’ would seem not to preclude all possibilities of 
receiving the safety valve after making a proffer after the start of a 
sentencing hearing.”116 The majority of circuits hold the plain 
language of the safety valve requires complete truthful disclosure 
before sentencing, but previous lies or omissions do not automatically 
preclude safety valve relief. 
 
                                                 
109
 Id. (quoting United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
110
 United States v. Rodriguez, 676 F.3d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
111
 Id. at 188-89. 
112
 Id. at 190-91. 
113
 United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 142 F.3d 1233, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 1998). 
114
 United States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 745 (8th Cir. 2003). 
115
 Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Morones, 181 F.3d 888, 891 n.2 (8th 
Cir. 1999).   
116
 Id.   
18
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III. A CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS: HOW THE SAFETY VALVE 
FAILS TO CORRECT UNJUST MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES THE 
WAY CONGRESS INTENDED 
Congress blamed “uncertain and inadequate penalties” for the 
growing drug problem, so it enacted mandatory minimums.
117
 
However, mandatory minimums are untenable, and, as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist pointed out, lead to several unintended and undesirable 
consequences.
118
 First, mandatory minimums “upset federalism” 
because they turn many state drug offenses into federal crimes.
119
 
Second, both mandatory minimums and the Sentencing Guidelines are 
unfair and fail to work as Congress intended.
120
 Third, the current 
sentencing system “expressly forbids judges from considering 
personal characteristics like the defendant’s age and family 
responsibilities.”121 However, “[j]ustice in sentencing requires an 
individualized assessment of the offender and the offense . . . [which] 
cannot be made by a distant bureaucracy pursuant to abstract rules that 
disregard important context.”122  
Mandatory minimums “squander scarce resources” because 
defendants receive sentences far greater than are reasonable.
123
 This is 
due, in part, because mandatory minimums “typically identify just one 
aggravating factor, and then pin the prescribed enhanced sentence 
                                                 
117
 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 199, 199 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3221-23. 
118
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony) supra note 
18, at 2 (William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Drugs 
and Violence in America: Proceedings of the Inaugural Symposium on Crime and 
Punishment in the United States, 283, 286 (1993). 
119
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement), supra 
note 18, at 5. 
120
 Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimum Sentences Usurp Judicial Power, 
Executive Summary, 4, available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa458.pdf. 
121
 Id. 
122
 Id.  
123
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 18, at 2. 
19
Kitchen: Don't Break the Safety Valve's Heart: How the Seventh Circuit Sup
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
347 
 
totally on that one factor” disregarding all mitigating factors.124 
Mandatory sentences also are frequently unpredictable, and their 
“inflexibility and deliberate inattention to context” ultimately produces 
unfair and unjust results – results the Seventh Circuit alluded to in 
Acevedo-Fitz.
125
 Because mandatory minimums are unjust, they 
corrode “our judicial system [which] must enjoy the respect of the 
public. The robotic imposition of sentences that are viewed as unfair 
or irrational greatly undermines that respect.”126 Moreover, 
“mandatory minimums are automatic, indiscriminate, and blunt 
provisions that deny trial courts the ability to calibrate punishment to 
correspond to a defendant’s actual criminal conduct and 
circumstances.”127 The safety valve fails to address these issues 
because the vast majority of defendants are not eligible; the safety 
valve fails to remedy unjust sentences under the mandatory minimum, 
and the safety valve fails to solve the problems inherent with 
substantial assistance. 
 
A. The Vast Majority of Defendants Are Not Eligible for the Safety 
Valve 
The safety valve provides relief for defendants convicted of 
five specific offenses involving certain controlled substances: 1) drug 
trafficking; 2) possession; 3) smuggling; 4) attempt or conspiracy to 
violate controlled substance provisions; or 5) attempt or conspiracy to 
violate the controlled substance import/export provisions.
128
 To be 
eligible for the safety valve, defendants must provide complete truthful 
                                                 
124
 Id. at 5-6.  
125
 Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 208, 211; United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 
F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2014); Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, supra note 21 at 13-15. 
126
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 18, at 2; United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 974-75 (N.D. Iowa 
2013). 
127
 Com. v. Carela-Tolentino, 48 A.3d 1221, 1227 (2012). 
128
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
20
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disclosure to prosecutors.
129
 But the required form of this disclosure is 
unclear.
130
 Most frequently, prosecutors interview the defendant, or 
the defendant provides a proffer.
131
 However, simply because a 
defendant proffers a statement and invites prosecutors to request 
additional information does not guarantee the defendant will 
qualify.
132
 While judges independently determine if a defendant 
provided complete truthful disclosure,
133
 judges must rely on the 
prosecutor’s input about that disclosure because the defendant 
discloses his information to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor has all 
the information regarding the transaction.
134
 This means prosecutors’ 
“near-total control” over safety valve eligibility makes it “virtually 
impossible for an offender to obtain safety valve relief without the 
prosecutor’s support, because he would have to convince the judge ‒ 
over the prosecutor’s opposition ‒ that he has been truthful and 
complete.”135 Because prosecutors frequently want as much 
information as possible, they likely will ignore the fifth element’s 
express statement that the information need not be useful or novel.
136
 
Some prosecutors even charge defendants with crimes not covered by 
                                                 
129
 United States v. Jimenez-Martinez, 83 F.3d 488, 495-96 (1st Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Contreras, 136 F.3d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Cervantes, 519 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008).  
130
 United States v. De La Torre, 599 F.3d 1198, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2010). 
131
 United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 
108-09 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1093 (7th Cir. 1998). 
132
 U.S. v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 675 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 882, 884 
(2d Cir 1997); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1996). 
133
 United States v. Stewart, 391 F. App’x 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1999). 
134
 United States v. Alvarado-Rivera, 412 F.3d 942, 949-50 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(Bright, J., Dissenting); Bronn, supra note 26, at 498.  
135
 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 3-4; United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-
259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010); United States v. 
Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008).  
136
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). 
21
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the safety valve to ensure the defendant is ineligible.
137
 If a defendant 
is ineligible for the safety valve he can only receive a sentence less 
than the mandatory minimum by providing substantial assistance.
138
 
These issues mean the safety valve fails to address “federal 
prosecutors’ charging discretion.”139 This may explain why judges, 
activists and legal scholars want judges to determine eligibility.
140
  
Most drug offenders receive mandatory minimum sentences largely 
because the safety valve’s scope is limited.141 Many judges and 
scholars feel Congress should expand the safety valve, particularly 
since more than two-hundred thousand people are serving mandatory 
minimum “one-size-fits-all” sentences.142 Twenty-eight former United 
States Attorneys turned judges feel the continuing sentencing disparity 
even with the safety valve “cannot be justified and results in sentences 
that are unjust and do not serve society’s interest.”143 Former 
prosecutors, judges and legal commentators join groups like the 
American Bar Association and the non-partisan Federal Judicial 
Center in calling to repeal mandatory minimums, or at the very least to 
limit their use to “the most extraordinary circumstances.”144 One judge 
                                                 
137
 Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1, 54 (September 2010). 
138
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(f), (e); Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 2.  
139
 Oliss, supra note 11, at 1890; see United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 
(JG), 2010 WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). 
140
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 16, at 8.  
141
 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 12; Luna & Cassell, supra note 137, at 
54.  
142
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement) supra note 
18, at 6; Doyle, supra note 21, at 7. 
143
 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal 
Sentencing Policy, 2 (May 2002) available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and
_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_
and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf (Statement by Certain United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals and District Court Judges who Previously Served as United States 
Attorneys, regarding the penalties for powder and crack cocaine (April 16, 2002)). 
144
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement), supra 
note 18, at 5; Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), 
supra note 18, at 22. 
22
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summarized the continuing sentencing issues, stating “any reasonable 
person who exposes himself or herself to this system of sentencing, 
whether judge or politician, would come to the conclusion that such 
sentencing must be abandoned in favor of a system based on principles 
of fairness and proportionality.”145   
B. The Safety Valve Fails to Fix Sentencing Disparities Inherent in 
Mandatory Minimums and Further Fails to Fix the Issues Caused by 
Substantial Assistance 
The safety valve fails to address the mandatory minimum’s 
sentencing disparities, including “inverted sentences,” which occur 
when a low-level defendant receives a similar sentence to a higher-
level offender when that higher-level offender has more information to 
provide; “misplaced equality,” which happens when statutes result in 
sentences that are neither proportional nor commensurable under the 
circumstances; and “cliffs,” which happen when similarly situated 
defendants receive vastly different sentences.
146
 The safety valve also 
fails to fix the issues inherent with substantial assistance, often called 
the cooperation paradox.
147
  
 Inverted sentences occur because a defendant who committed a 
more serious crime can disclose more information.
148
 The Seventh 
Circuit addressed this issue in United States v. Brigham, stating “[t]he 
more serious the defendant’s crimes, the lower the sentence—because 
                                                 
145
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 18, at 31 (quoting Senior Judge Vincent L. Broderick, Southern District of New 
York, speaking for the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law in 
testimony about mandatory minimum sentences before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, July 28, 1993). 
146
 United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); Special Report 
to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
supra note 21; Oliss, supra note 11, at 1888; Albonetti, supra note 10, at 408. 
147
 Brigham, 977 F.2d at 317-18 (low-level driver sentenced to 120 months, 
kingpin to 84. “Mandatory minimum penalties, combined with a power to grant 
exemptions, create a prospect of inverted sentences”); United States v. Evans, 970 
F.2d 663, 676-78 & n.19 (10th Cir. 1992) (low level defendants sentenced between 
210 months and life, organizers sentenced to probation or supervised release). 
148
 Id. at 318; Doyle, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
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the greater his wrongs, the more information and assistance he has to 
offer to a prosecutor.”149 Further, mandatory minimums “distort 
traditional roles by transferring judicial discretion to legislatures as 
well as prosecutors.”150 When judges lack sentencing discretion and 
prosecutors have “undue and unreviewable influence,” sentences are 
disproportionate.
151
 Indeed, judges must often impose mandatory 
minimums that “seem[] greatly disproportionate to the crime and 
terribly cruel to the human being.”152 As one judge summarized: “The 
absence of fit between the crude method of punishment and the 
particular set of circumstances before me was conspicuous; when I 
imposed sentence . . . everyone present, including the prosecutor, 
could feel the injustice.”153  
 Mandatory minimums intentionally create disproportionate 
sentences because they “resemble a search for severity,” focusing on a 
single factor so “a severe penalty that might be appropriate for the 
most egregious of offenders will likewise be required for the least 
culpable violator.”154 This means many offenders receive excessive 
sentences.
155
 Such misplaced equality is “inconsistent with the 
sentencing reform objectives of proportionality and uniformity.”156 
While proponents of mandatory minimums claim long sentences deter 
crime, in actuality this deterrence is exceedingly low, leading to the 
incarceration of large numbers of easily replaced low-level drug 
dealers without benefitting society.
157
 In many instances, mandatory 
                                                 
149
 Brigham, 977 F.2d at 318. 
150
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement), supra 
note 18, at 5.  
151
 Id.; Brigham, 977 F.2d, at 317-18; Evans, 970 F.2d at 676-78.  
152
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 18, at 8.  
153
 United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2010). 
154
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra 
note 18, at 2, 6-7. 
155
 Id. at 2; Brigham, 977 F.2d, at 317-18; Evans, 970 F.2d, at 676-78 & n.19. 
156
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005).  
157
 United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 974-75 (N.D. Iowa 2013) 
(easily replaced); Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, 
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minimum sentences undermine “accurate outcomes” and may 
“increase the possibility of wrongful convictions.”158 This explains 
why most judges feel they “should be allowed to use the generally 
permissible sentencing factors.”159  
Under mandatory minimums, judges frequently must impose 
conflicting sentences for two defendants convicted of possessing the 
same amount of drugs.
160
 This cliff effect occurs because mandatory 
minimums are linked to the quantity of drugs, so small differences – 
such as 499 grams versus 500 grams – lead to vastly disparate 
sentences.
161
 The safety valve may make the cliff effect worse because 
defendants who are quite different in many respects often receive the 
exact same sentence.
162
 Therefore, the safety valve “increase[s] cliffs 
by establishing another mandatory bright-line rule that punishes very 
similar offenders with very different degrees of severity.”163 Reducing 
disparities – such as cliffs ‒ is a “prime directive” of the Sentencing 
Commission, which recently found the safety valve contributes to 
“widening sentencing gap[s].”164  
                                                                                                                   
supra note 144, at viii (letter from Judge John S. Martin, Jr. et al., p. 1) (benefitting 
society). 
158
 Luna & Cassell, supra note 138, at 67.  
159
 Doyle, supra note 21, at 4; United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 
WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). 
160
 United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.1991). 
161
 Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, supra note 21; Oliss, supra note 11, at 188; 5 Albonetti, 
supra note 10, at 409; Froyd, supra note 30, at 1499; USSC on Mandatory 
Minimums: Testimony of Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, 6 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 67, 67 (1993). 
162
 USSC on Mandatory Minimums, (Wilkins Testimony), supra note 162, at 
67; Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, supra note 21; Froyd, supra note 30, at 1499. 
163
 Oliss, supra note 11, at 1889-90; Special Report to Congress: Mandatory 
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, supra note 21; United 
States v. Blewett, 12-5226, 2013 WL 6231727 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) cert. denied, 
13-8947, 2014 WL 859676 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014). 
164
 Aaron Rappaport, The State of Severity, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 3, 3 
(July/August 1999) (prime directive); Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal 
Sentencing Policy, supra note 144, at 58 (gaps). 
25
Kitchen: Don't Break the Safety Valve's Heart: How the Seventh Circuit Sup
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 9, Issue 2                         Spring 2014 
 
353 
 
The safety valve fails to mitigate harsh drug sentences and, 
when an offender fails to qualify, mandatory minimums lead to longer 
sentences.
165
 Just twenty-three percent of drug offenders were eligible 
for the safety valve in 2012.
166
 Just six percent of those sentenced 
under the mandatory minimum were high-level offenders.
167
 Seventy-
one percent of low-level offenders were ineligible for the safety valve, 
and received mandatory minimum sentences.
168
 Presuming high-level 
offenders have a similar conviction rate to low-level offenders, the 
safety valve fails to provide shorter sentences for less culpable 
defendants.
169
 Mandatory minimums result in longer sentences for the 
most vulnerable and significantly longer sentences for minorities.
170
 
Racial sentencing disparity and even its perception “fosters disrespect 
for and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system.”171 Without 
confidence and respect, our jury system will be less effective because 
if individuals do not respect our laws they may be less likely to follow 
them.
172
  
                                                 
165
 Bowman & Heise, supra note 44, at 1071; Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, 
at 11; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, The Federal Prison Population 
Buildup: Overview, Policy Changes, Issues and Options 1, Summary & 15 tbl. 1 
(Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.  
166
 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, 
tbl. 44 (2013) available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/20
12/Table44.pdf; Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
167
 Id. at 170, tbl. 40; Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 3-4.  
168
 2012 Sourcebook, supra note 167, tbl. 40, 44; Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 
12, at 3-4. 
169
 United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 676-78 & n.19 (10th Cir. 1992). 
170
 United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 882 (N.D. Iowa 2011); 
Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, supra note 18, at 5 (Stewart Statement); 
Attorney General Eric Holder’s Remarks to American Bar Association (Aug. 12, 
2013) available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-
130812.html. 
171
 Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, supra note 
144, at viii. 
172
 Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Hearing on Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra note 18, at 2.  
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 The safety valve also does nothing to alleviate the disparity 
between almost identical defendants who receive drastically different 
sentences.
173
 Because an ineligible offender may have “mitigating 
circumstances that substantially differentiate him or her from other 
offenders dealing in the same quantity of drugs,” but cannot receive a 
lesser sentence, the safety valve does not solve “excessive 
uniformity.”174 This goes against fairness, because “[a] just legal 
system seeks not only to treat different cases differently but also to 
treat like cases alike. Fairness requires sentencing uniformity as well 
as efforts to recognize relevant sentencing differences.”175 In enacting 
the safety valve, Congress “focused upon the unfair way in which 
federal sentencing failed to treat similar offenders similarly,”176 and 
intended the safety valve to reduce the inequity and disparity caused 
by mandatory minimums by restricting them to “kingpins and 
managers.”177 However, the safety valve only applies to a small group 
of low-level defendants, does not apply to many others, and frequently 
fails entirely to assist mid-level offenders who are neither kingpins nor 
managers.
178
 Moreover, “[l]ow-level, non-violent drug addicts are not 
drug kingpins engaged in repeated and ‘extremely lucrative’ drug 
trafficking as envisioned by Congress. On the contrary, they [are] low-
level cogs in the drug trade, who are readily replaced.”179  
 The safety valve also fails to solve the problems of the 
cooperation paradox, which increases the inequity of mandatory 
                                                 
173
 United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2010); Oliss, supra note 11, at 1890. 
174
 Oliss, supra note 11, at 1890; Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1252 
(2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Special 
Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System, supra note 21. 
175
 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1252 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
176
 Id. 
177
 Vasquez, 2010 WL 1257359. 
178
 United States v. Diaz, 11-CR-00821-2 JG, 2013 WL 322243 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 
28, 2013); Adriano Hrvatin, Comment, Unconstitutional Exploitation of Delegated 
Authority: How to Deter Prosecutors from Using Substantial Assistance to Defeat 
the Intent of Federal Sentencing Laws, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 117, 157 (2002).  
179
 United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 974-75 (N.D. Iowa 2013). 
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minimum sentences under substantial assistance.
180
 Before the 
enactment of the safety valve, sentencing concessions were available 
only to those defendants who “provide[d] the most information at the 
earliest possible point in an investigation,” and generally required a 
defendant to testify against others or assist investigators.
181
 The 
substantial assistance exception provided powerful incentives for 
defendants to cooperate, but it also created a cooperation paradox, 
permitting sentence reductions only for those defendants with 
significant knowledge or responsibility,
182
 or for those defendants who 
win “the race to be the first to ‘spill the beans.’ ”183 This cooperation 
paradox, which results in “meting out the harshest penalties to those 
least culpable,” the Seventh Circuit recognizes “is troubling, because it 
accords with no one’s theory of appropriate punishments.”184 Because 
Congress modeled the safety valve’s truthful disclosure requirement 
after the substantial assistance provision, the safety valve shares many 
of these same problems.
185
 However, this modeling makes little sense, 
because the safety valve is based on the offender’s culpability while 
substantial assistance is based on the defendant’s ability and desire to 
assist prosecutors.
186
 Substantial assistance relates neither to the 
offender’s culpability nor to the traditional factors that determine if a 
defendant is a threat to society.
187
 In contrast, the safety valve’s first 
four elements reflect the traditional safety factors - 1) criminal history; 
                                                 
180
 United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 676-78 & n.19 (10th Cir. 1992); Schulhofer, supra 
note 118, at 211. 
181
 Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 211; United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 
358-59 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145, n.1 (5th Cir. 
1996); Brigham, 977 F.2d at 317-18. 
182
 Schulhofer, supra note 118, at 212; Brigham, 977 F.2d 317; Evans, 970 F.2d 
663. 
183
 Petrus, 588 F.3d at 358-59. 
184
 Brigham, 977 F.2d at 318. 
185
 Froyd, supra note 30, at 1499; Albonetti, supra note 10, at 410.  
186
 Froyd, supra note 30, at 1499; Albonetti, supra note 10, at 410.  
187
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(e), (f); Brigham, 977 F.2d at 317-18. 
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2) use of violence; 3) “death or serious bodily injury;” and 4) offender 
level.
188
  
 While Congress designed the safety valve to reduce disparate 
sentences, it “is not a cure-all. It does not completely loosen the 
heavy-handed approach of mandatory minimums for many, if not 
most, drug defendants.”189 In actuality, under the safety valve many 
similar offenders continue to receive vastly different sentences.
190
 As 
one judge lamented, the safety valve, while “commendable in spirit, 
amount[s] to gnats around the ankles of the elephant . . . safety valve 
relief from a mandatory minimum does no more than relegate the 
defendant to a Guidelines range that matches, and even exceeds, the 
mandatory minimum.”191 Thus, the safety valve fails to remedy 
disparities and ensure only high-level offenders receive mandatory 
minimum sentences.
192
 This “offend[s] a bedrock principle of justice” 
because the sentences are “greater than necessary to comply’ with the 
purposes of punishment.”193 Moreover, the safety valve “often lead[s] 
to absurd results,”194 and Washington lawmakers sentencing crimes 
rather than individuals is “utterly un-American.”195 
 
                                                 
188
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
189
 Jon M. Sands, Note, How Does the Safety Valve Work? Sentencing Issues 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553{F} AND U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, Champion Column Grid & Bear 
It 39, 42 (Dec. 1996); Ronald Weich, The Battle Against Mandatory Minimums: a 
Report from the Front Lines, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 94 (1996); Hrvatin, supra note 179, 
at 157. 
190
 Oliss, supra note 11, at 1890; United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
191
 United States v. Diaz, 11-CR-00821-2 JG, 2013 WL 322243, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013). 
192
 United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 882, 883 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Contreras, 136 F.3d 
1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1998). 
193
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement), supra 
note 18, at 5.  
194
 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 12, at 3; Hearing on Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, (Carnes Testimony), supra note 18, at 2. 
195
 Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentences, (Stewart Statement), supra 
note 18, at 1.  
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IV. COURTS SHOULD UTILIZE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION, 
NOT  SUPERIMPOSE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS ON THE 
SAFETY VALVE, AND PERMIT RELIEF FOR DEFENDANTS WHO 
ORIGINALLY LIE TO ALIGN WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
 The safety valve “grant[s] relief to defendants whose 
knowledge may be of little or no use to the government,” and who 
cannot meet the substantial assistance requirements.
196
 However, the 
judicial good faith interpretation of the safety valve superimposes 
substantial assistance requirements on the fifth element, which results 
in unintended consequences that fail to comport with Congress’ 
intent.
197
 Courts should use the plain language of statutes unless the 
result is either “so gross as to shock . . . common sense” or “is 
‘demonstrably at odds’ with legislative intent.”198 The Second Circuit 
explains how this applies to the safety valve: “the text provides no 
basis for distinguishing among defendants who make full disclosure 
immediately upon contact with the government, defendants who 
disclose piecemeal as the proceedings unfold, and defendants who 
wait for the statutory deadline.”199 One advantage of conditioning 
safety valve relief on complete truthful disclosure is that because the 
defendant is hoping for a reduced sentence, it makes sense to require 
he prove he has disclosed all the information he has.
200
 The plain 
language reading of the safety valve provides a greater incentive for 
defendants to tell the truth by permitting them to decide to tell the 
truth until their sentencing.
201
  
                                                 
196
 United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1996). 
197
 United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2003); H.R. REP. NO.103-
460 (1994). 
198
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) and United States v. Reyes, 116 F.3d 
67, 71 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
199
 Id.  
200
 Shebesta, supra note 22, at 544. 
201
 Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103; United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 935 (9th Cir. 1996); Krecht v. United 
States, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Figueroa, 199 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000)); Shebesta, supra note 22, at 554. 
30
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A. Conditioning Safety Valve Relief on Complete Truthful Disclosure 
from the Moment a Defendant Invokes the Safety Valve and Failing to 
Require any Proof from the Prosecutor a Defendant Lied Frustrates 
Congress’ Purpose Because This Judicial Interpretation Superimposes 
Substantial Assistance on the Safety Valve’s Fifth Element 
Courts – including the Seventh Circuit ‒ treat the safety valve 
the same way they treat substantial assistance.
202
 But this is improper 
because the two statutes work in separate and distinct ways.
203
 
Substantial assistance is not a “precondition to safety valve relief” and 
the truthful disclosure element “need not rise to the level of substantial 
assistance.”204 While substantial assistance requires a defendant’s 
information help the prosecutor, the fifth element of the safety valve 
expressly provides the information need not be “relevant or useful.”205 
Thus the safety valve “focus[es] . . . on the defendant’s providing 
information, rather than on the Government’s need for information.”206 
Further, prosecutors can “penalize[e] defendants who lie or withhold 
information during proffer sessions” under an independent and 
unrelated statute.
207
  
 The statutes’ titles further illustrate their differences. 
Substantial assistance is entitled “Limited Authority to impose a 
sentence below a statutory minimum.”208 Thus, substantial assistance 
is a departure from the mandatory minimum, leaving the mandatory 
minimum as “a reference point for a specific, carefully circumscribed 
                                                 
202
 Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 939 (quoting United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 
149 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
203
 United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 393-94 (3d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Fountain, 223 F.3d 
927, 928 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
204
 Tournier, 171 F.3d at 647 (precondition); United States v. Montanez, 82 
F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1996) (substantial assistance). 
205
 Krecht, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(f)(5), (e). 
206
 United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1996). 
207
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice)). 
208
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
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type of departure” but the mandatory minimum still applies.209 In 
contrast, the safety valve’s title “Limitation on the applicability of 
statutory minimums in certain cases” makes it an excusal from “the 
mandatory minimum [which] is to be disregarded once certain 
conditions are met.”210 This demonstrates how Congress “intended to 
authorize sentencing judges to ignore the limitations imposed by 
statutory minimum sentences and treat a ‘mandatory minimum’ case 
like any other.”211 Had Congress intended the safety valve to operate 
the same way as substantial assistance, it would likely never have 
enacted the safety valve. Congress enacted the safety to rectify many 
injustices under the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme; 
injustices that substantial assistance did not address.
212
 Congress 
intended the safety valve to provide leniency for low-level defendants 
who provide what information they have regardless of whether it is 
new or useful, so disclosure need “not amount to ‘substantial 
assistance.’”213 Indeed, “[t]he sharp divergence between these regimes 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that Congress had different plans in 
mind for the operation and effect of the two provisions.”214  
Providing separate requirements for the safety valve and 
substantial assistance also aligns with the reasons behind the safety 
valve ‒ to provide an opportunity for lower level offenders to escape 
sentencing under harsh mandatory minimums.
215
 Most safety valve 
litigation regards the fifth factor, and focuses on the amount of 
information the defendant provided, when he provided it, and how 
                                                 
209
 United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Fountain, 223 F.3d 927, 928 (8th Cir. 2000). 
210
 Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 59; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Poyato, 454 
F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Holguin, 436 F.3d 111, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Morrisette, 429 F.3d 318, 324-25 (1st Cir. 2005). 
211
 Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 59. 
212
 United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996); Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing Reform Act of 1994, H.R. REP. NO.103-460, 103rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1994); S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1983). 
213
 United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1996). 
214
 Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 59. 
215
 United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2003); H.R. REP. NO. 103-
460, at 5 (1994); Hrvatin, supra note 179, at 215. 
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much information he must provide about other conspirators and 
conduct outside the actual charges.
216
 This is due in part because the 
determination of whether a defendant completely and truthfully 
provided all information at his disposal “rests largely on a necessarily 
imprecise and largely unverifiable assessment by the prosecutor.”217 
This leaves prosecutors with “considerable de facto discretion either to 
smooth the path to a safety valve adjustment or to block it.”218  
Despite the safety valve’s explicit statement that the 
defendant’s information need not be useful, judges “apply the [fifth] 
element in the same manner that they apply the substantial assistance 
provision: by looking to approval from the government. Instead of 
utilizing the government’s word as a mere recommendation, judges 
have permitted it to become dispositive of the credibility 
determination.”219 This means even with the safety valve, cooperation 
is the only meaningful way defendants can reduce their sentences.
220
 
Thus, judicial interpretation implying a good faith substantial 
assistance requirement into the fifth element extends the same 
sentencing problems Congress enacted the safety valve to remedy.
221
 
A plain language reading of the safety valve would permit the safety 
valve to work the way Congress intended and not re-introduce a 
substantial assistance requirement. 
                                                 
216
 United States v. Feliz, 453 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vazquez, 460 F. App’x 
442, 444 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 104 (2d Cir. 
1999); United States v. Rodriguez-Colon, 296 F. App’x 767, 768 (11th Cir. 2008). 
217
 Bowman & Heise, supra note 44, at 1072, 1073. 
218
 Id. at 1073; United States v. Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010);  United States v. Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
219
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 484; Vasquez, 2010 WL 1257359; United States v. 
Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996); Hearing on Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, supra note 18, at 5 (Stewart Statement). 
220
 United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 390 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Krumnow, 476 F.3d 294, 295-98 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Christensen, 582 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 
666, 673 (7th Cir. 2009). 
221
 United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2003); H.R. REP. NO. 103-
460, at 5 (1994); United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1996).  
33
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1. Placing the Burden of Proof on Defendants Without any 
Prosecutorial Showing Regarding Truthful Disclosure Reinstates 
Substantial Assistance on the Safety Valve 
Neither the safety valve nor its legislative history discusses the 
burden of proof, but the Seventh Circuit interpreted the safety valve as 
requiring defendants prove they met all five elements.
222
 The court  
assumed the safety valve was a departure from mandatory minimums, 
so it allocated the burden of proof the same way it did other 
departures, like substantial assistance.
223
 Other circuits followed.
224
 
But the Seventh Circuit misread the safety valve provision: it is not a 
departure but rather an excusal from mandatory minimums.
225
 So the 
burden of proof for the safety valve need not be allocated the same 
way it is for departures.
226
 Requiring the defendant to prove their 
eligibility without any affirmative showing from the government 
regarding the statement’s truthfulness means the government need 
only make a blanket statement to preclude eligibility.
227
 Accepting the 
government’s claims about truthful disclosure without further 
investigation “transforms the . . . safety valve into the . . . substantial 
assistance provision,” particularly “because fear of a negative 
recommendation by the government puts immense pressure on the 
defendant to disclose as much information as possible . . . for fear that 
                                                 
222
 United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1097-99 (7th Cir. 1996). 
223
 Ramirez, 94 F.3d at 1097-99; Bronn, supra note 24, at 501-02. 
224
 United States v. Montanez, 105 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Verners, 103 F.3d 108, 110 (10th, Cir. 1996) (citing Ramirez, 94 F.3d at 1100-1102); 
United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Honea, 
660 F.3d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 2011); Bronn, supra note 26, at 485. 
225
 Ramirez, 94 F.3d at 1100; Bronn, supra note 26, at 501-02. 
226
 Ramirez, 94 F.3d at 1100; Bronn, supra note 26, at 501-02.  
227
 Honea, 660 F.3d at 328; Verners, 103 F.3d at 110; Ajugwo, 82 F.3d at 929; 
United States v. Miller, 179 F.3d 961, 967-68 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States 
v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 529 -30 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Gales, 
560 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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the government will be unsatisfied and claim that the defendant is 
lying.”228  
Judges have no reliable way to determine whether a defendant 
provided all information they had and a defendant is frequently unable 
to prove his information was truthful, particularly when prosecutors 
disagree.
229
 Certainly, as the Seventh Circuit acknowledges, low-level 
drug dealers frequently have little information because criminal 
enterprises purposely restrict low-level dealers’ knowledge of the 
overall operation, so they have no information to provide.
230
 Criminal 
enterprises may intentionally provide false information to low-level 
dealers to send prosecutors astray.
231
 The Seventh Circuit described 
this precise problem: “[d]rones of the organization‒the runners, mules, 
drivers, and lookouts ‒ . . . lack the contacts and trust necessary to set 
up big deals, and they know little information of value. Whatever tales 
they have to tell, their bosses will have related.”232 It is also likely 
prosecutors will frequently feel they have not received enough 
information, particularly because they almost certainly have more 
information than does any low-level defendant. As the safety valve 
expressly states, “the fact that the defendant has ‘no relevant or useful’ 
information to provide will not prevent a finding that the defendant 
has fulfilled the fifth requirement only requires defendants be 
completely forthcoming.”233 However, because judges must make 
credibility determinations based solely on the defendant’s proffer and 
                                                 
228
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 496-97; e.g. Miller, 179 F.3d at 967-68; Gales, 560 
F. Supp. 2d at 28. 
229
 Virginia G. Villa, Retooling Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Fixing the 
Federal “Statutory Safety Valve” to Act As an Effective Mechanism for Clemency in 
Appropriate Cases, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 109, 124(1997); Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 
29; United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Milo, 506 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 147-
48 (7th Cir. 1996). 
230
 United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992); Deborah Young, 
Rethinking the Commission’s Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases Where Quantity 
Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENT. REP. 2, 64 (1990). 
231
 Young, supra note 231, at 63-64. 
232
 Brigham, 977 F.2d at 317. 
233
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 938. 
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the government’s bare assertion about the proffer’s truthfulness 
without any further showing, there is little opportunity to find the 
truth.
234
 By permitting prosecutors to control the eligibility 
determination, many “otherwise eligible and truthful defendants” will 
be ineligible.
235
 This goes against Congressional intent, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Congress enacted the safety valve, and 
did not include a government motion requirement.
236
 It also frustrates 
judges because, “by merely asserting doubt about an offender’s 
truthfulness, a prosecutor can place the offender in the position of 
having to prove a negative. It is difficult to imagine how a defendant 
can prove that he does not know a supplier’s name.”237 This judicial 
dissatisfaction with requiring a defendant prove all five elements with 
no evidence provided by the prosecution that he has not told the truth 
has been a contentious issue since the safety valve’s enactment.238  
 One common objection to shifting the burden to the 
government is that it would encourage low-level offenders to lie; 
however, this is inapposite.
239
 Since defendants only qualify for the 
safety valve if they provide truthful disclosure, many will not lie for 
fear of losing their chance at relief.
240
 This is particularly true since 
most courts consider lies or omissions when they determine whether 
the defendant eventually provided complete truthful disclosure.
241
 
Another objection is prosecutors may have to reveal information about 
continuing drug investigations.
242
 However, the government has all the 
                                                 
234
 Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 29; Bronn, supra note 26, at 488. 
235
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 485-86. 
236
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(e), (f); United States v. Stewart, 391 F. App’x 490, 494 
(6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1999). 
237
 Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  
238
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 488; United States v. Diaz, 11-CR-00821-2 JG, 
2013 WL 322243, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013). 
239
 United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998). 
240
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1999). 
241
 United States v. Brownlee, 204 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); Schreiber, 
191 F.3d 103 at 107; Deltoro–Aguilera v. United States, 625 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
242
 Bronn, supra note 26,at 504-05. 
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requisite information to prove whether the defendant is truthful,
243
 and 
prosecutors could reveal this proof in camera so as not to threaten any 
on-going investigations. More importantly, this concern is irrelevant to 
the reasons Congress passed the safety valve.
244
 Requiring the 
government prove a defendant was untruthful would preserve 
Congress’s intent, because “[i]f the government had to weigh the cost 
of challenging the defendant’s disclosure with potential difficulties in 
their ongoing investigations . . . [it would] only challenge a 
defendant’s safety[]valve credibility in instances when the government 
has valid evidence that the defendant was untruthful.”245  
 Most circuits, including the Seventh, place the burden of 
proving safety valve eligibility on the defendant,
246
 but two circuits 
require the government prove the defendant failed to meet the fifth 
element. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits shift the burden of proof to the 
government with regard to truthful disclosure, which helps ensure the 
safety valve comports with Congress’s intent.247 Congress 
intentionally distinguished the two provisions in several ways ‒ one 
important method was to give the judge the ultimate eligibility 
decision.
248
 Another is that the safety valve is concerned solely with 
truthful disclosure, and not whether the defendant can provide new or 
useful information.
249
 By relying solely on a prosecutor’s statements, 
“the courts have evaded their responsibility of determining 
eligibility.”250 If courts insisted the government demonstrate 
untruthfulness, it would better serve the safety valve’s purpose of 
providing an opportunity for a lesser sentence for defendants who 
                                                 
243
 Id. 
244
 United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2003); H.R. REP. NO. 103-
460, at 5 (1994). 
245
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 505. 
246
 United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967, 969-70 (7th Cir. 2014); Matos, 
328 F.3d at 38; Bronn, supra note 26, at 488. 
247
 United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Miller, 179 F.3d 961, 961 (5th Cir. 1999). 
248
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(e), (f); Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 940. 
249
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(e), (f); Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 940. 
250
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 498.  
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provide complete truthful disclosure.
251
 Because the safety valve is not 
tied to the defendant’s ability to assist the government, and because 
most low-level defendants cannot assist the government because they 
lack knowledge,
252
 the concerns underlying substantial assistance do 
not apply to the safety valve.
253
 Courts should construe ambiguous 
statutes in favor of defendants, so the burden of proof should shift to 
the government when the fifth factor may make a defendant ineligible 
for the safety valve.
254
 Requiring the government prove a defendant 
failed to meet the fifth factor “honors the safety valve’s mandate that 
the offender’s disclosure need not be new or useful.”255 It would also 
ensure judges make the final determination, and prevent prosecutors 
from “mak[ing] adverse eligibility recommendations if they are simply 
unsatisfied with the defendant’s disclosure.”256 
 
 
2. Judicial Interpretation Requiring Defendants to Provide Truthful 
Disclosure from the Time They Invoke Safety Valve Relief Goes 
Against Congressional Intent by Requiring Substantial Assistance for 
Safety Valve Relief 
Many courts that grant safety valve relief to defendants who lie 
before telling the truth hold defendants must provide complete 
disclosure before the sentencing hearing occurs.
257
 The sentencing 
hearing deadline improves efficiency by creating a bright-line rule that 
                                                 
251
 Id. at 500; Shrestha, 86 F.3d at 940; Miller, 179 F.3d at 961;  United States 
v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 519 (1st Cir. 1996).  
252
 United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992). 
253
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Van Etten, supra note 28, at 1297.  
254
 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991). 
255
 Bronn, supra note 26, at 507. 
256
 Id.  
257
 United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Edwards, 65 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 
108-09 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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is easy to apply, reduces time in court, keeps the government from 
having to argue against its use after that time, and permits the 
government to question the defendant more extensively about his 
statement.
258
 However, this bright-line rule shares a major problem 
with all bright-line rules because “it sweeps so broadly that it creates 
harsh results that were probably not intended.”259  
Regarding the disclosure’s timing, Congress did not intend the 
safety valve to “spare the government the trouble of preparing for and 
proceeding with trial,” or “provid[e] the government a means to 
reward a defendant for supplying useful information.”260 Substantial 
assistance addresses these considerations, and defendants who obstruct 
investigations receive longer sentences.
261
 Moreover, the safety 
valve’s “plain words . . . provide only one deadline for 
compliance . . . Nothing in the statute suggests that a defendant is 
automatically disqualified if he or she previously lied or withheld 
information.”262 Nor does it “distinguish[] among defendants who 
make full disclosure immediately upon contact with the government, 
defendants who disclose piecemeal as the proceedings unfold, and 
defendants who wait for the statutory deadline by disclosing ‘not later 
than’ sentencing.”263 Even defendants who provide “tardy or grudging 
cooperation,”264 are eligible for safety valve relief because defendants 
satisfy the truthfulness requirement, “regardless of [their] timing or 
motivation,” rendering any “pre-sentencing delays” irrelevant.265  
A major justification for imprisonment is to protect society.
266
 
However, this concern is addressed by the safety valve’s first four 
                                                 
258
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011); Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006). 
259
 Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Deville, 988 S.W.2d 331, 336-37 (Tex. App. 
1999); United States v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 89 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
$8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2003). 
260
 United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996). 
261
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1107. 
262
 Schreiber, 191 F.3d at 106. 
263
 Id. 
264
 United States v. Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999). 
265
 Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1106. 
266
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Bronn, supra note 26, at 505-06.  
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requirements ‒ criminal history, use of violence, whether the act 
resulted in “death or serious bodily injury,” and the offender’s 
involvement.
267
 Further, a defendant’s truthfulness does not align with 
their culpability or the threat they pose to society.
268
 Thus, courts 
should work to ensure the safety valve applies to low-level offenders, 
rather than using the fifth element as a proxy for substantial assistance 
and unfettered prosecutorial discretion.
269
 As one court aptly stated:  
The government is not free to play cat and mouse with 
defendants, leading safety valve debriefings down blind 
alleys and then blaming the defendants for failing to 
disclose material facts. Nor can the government 
squeeze all the juice from the orange and then deprive a 
truthful and cooperative defendant of his end of the 
bargain by juxtaposing trivial inconsistencies or 
exaggerating inconsequential omissions.
270
  
Disqualification based on one lie defeats the safety valve’s purpose ‒ 
to reduce the severity of sentences imposed on low-level 
defendants.
271
  
Because insisting upon complete disclosure from the time a 
defendant invokes safety valve relief re-imposes the substantial 
assistance requirement, the Seventh Circuit’s good faith interpretation 
essentially reinstates mandatory minimums for a majority of offenders, 
excluding too many defendants and creating unfair results because the 
safety valve’s text does not impose any such requirement.272 The plain 
language interpretation is persuasive, as Congress did not intend 
                                                 
267
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Bronn, supra note 26, at 505-06. 
268
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1992). 
269
 United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Vasquez, 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010); United 
States v. Gales, 560 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008). 
270
 Matos, 328 F.3d at 42. 
271
 United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999); H.R. REP. 
NO.103-460, at 2 (1994); Shebesta, supra note 22, at 553-54. 
272
 United States v. Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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delays in truthful disclosure to preclude safety valve relief, but rather 
intended to rectify harsh mandatory minimum sentences.
273
 Moreover, 
Congress’ purpose for passing the safety valve is separate from ‒ and 
unrelated to ‒ substantial assistance.274 Because Congress intended the 
safety valve to benefit defendants, and the rule of lenity requires courts 
construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants due to the 
severity and moral implications of a criminal conviction, courts should 
construe the safety valve in the defendant’s favor when the fifth factor 
may make a defendant ineligible for the safety valve.
275
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all these reasons, the judicially imposed requirement that 
defendants provide complete truthful disclosure from the moment they 
invoke the safety valve defeats the safety valve’s purpose: to spare less 
culpable offenders from mandatory minimum sentences.
276
 Utilizing 
the plain-language interpretation of the safety valve would result in a 
greater number of defendants being eligible, and would help mitigate 
inverted sentences, misplaced equality, and cliffs.
277
 Providing an 
incentive to defendants to disclose information to the government 
serves a utilitarian function.
278
 It makes sense to require the defendant 
provide complete truthful disclosure as it is the defendant who hopes 
for a reduced sentence and the government may receive useful 
information.
279
 The plain language interpretation of the safety valve 
                                                 
273
 United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007). 
274
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Matos, 328 F.3d at 36; H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 5 
(1994). 
275
 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
276
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 (10th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999); Matos, 328 F.3d at 36; H.R. 
REP. NO. 103-460, at 5.  
277
 United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); Special Report 
to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
supra note 21; Oliss, supra note 11, at 1888; Albonetti, supra note 10, at 408. 
278
 Shebesta, supra note 22, at 544. 
279
 Id.  
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provides greater incentive for defendants to provide complete truthful 
information to prosecutors because a defendant who is disqualified 
after one lie has no reason to share any more information.
280
 
Furthermore, immediately disqualifying a defendant due to a prior lie 
or omission means more defendants receive disparate and harsh 
sentences.
281
 Congress enacted the safety valve because, “for the very 
offenders who most warrant proportionally lower sentences-offenders 
that by guideline definitions are the least culpable-mandatory 
minimums generally operate to block the sentence from reflecting 
mitigating factors.”282 So the “least culpable offenders may receive the 
same sentences as their relatively more culpable counterparts.”283 The 
current sentencing system “is perceptibly unfair: mandatory statutory 
sentences [are] applied consistently only to those who are the least 
culpable, and to whom, perhaps, the statutes should not apply at 
all.”284 A plain language reading of the safety valve, as utilized in most 
circuits, comports with Congress’ intent while providing just sentences 
for low-level defendants.  
 
                                                 
280
 18 U.S.C. § § 3553(f); Shebesta, supra note 22, at 554. 
281
 Matos, 328 F.3d at 36; Brigham, 977 F.2d at 317-18; United States v. 
Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 676-78 & n.19 (10th Cir. 1992); H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 5 
(1994); Shebesta, supra note 22, at 554. 
282
 United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 103-460, at 5 (1994)). 
        
283
 Views from the Sentencing Commission, 12 REP. FED. SENT. R. 347 (JUNE 1, 
2000); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-460, at 5 (1994); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 
166, 171 (7th Cir. 1996); Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 378; United States v. Tournier, 
171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999); Matos, 328 F.3d at 36. 
284
 Villa, supra note 230, at 121. 
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